milieu they construct. Different cultures have different ways of mediating this interaction; in some societies the relations between them may emerge in the context of kinship, in others in ritual, politics or a variety of other domains. Despite this diversity, I propose that both autonomy and interdependence have affective qualities; they are part of the set of emotions through which people locate themselves in their social and cultural environments. Autonomy and relatedness are not, in most cases, conflatable with individual emotions in different societies, but are associated with a cluster of emotions that mediate the relations between individuals and collectivities. Autonomy is associated with particular clusters in each society, which might include pride, assertiveness or superiority, while relatedness is associated with affects such as caring, love, sorrow and empathy. Each cluster, however, takes its more holistic value from its relations with the other cluster of emotions. The dynamic between the two sets constitutes the larger structure I want to examine here.
Emotions as affective schemas
What are emotions? Emotions are bodily experiences in that they are situated in an organism, but they mediate relations between the subject and the external environment and are often provoked by events outside the individual. Emotions are thus activities that negotiate the interface between inside and outside, individual and collective, public and private, bodiliness and cognition, meaning and feeling. As mediating phenomena, emotions are a conduit between these different domains. Neither totally social nor totally innate, emotions are subjective manifestations and transformations of important biological and psychodynamic processes. These processes are accorded different names (drives, desires, instincts or basic needs) by different theorists (Freud, Jung, Lacan, Malinowski, Piaget, etc.) . Emotions arise in the interface between subjective patterns of desire or needs and the contingencies of the objective world. Physiological responses to stimuli are modulated by social patterns, cultural expectations and individual experience. While emotions first emerge as biological responses to external stimuli, these responses are remembered as part of a context and not in isolation. Thus emotions become embedded in schemas, or patterns of action, which are learned in direct interaction with the environmentsocial, cultural and physical. These schemas are stored or internalized and applied in appropriate contexts later on, and may be modified continuously through experiences. As these schemas develop, they undergo a complex process of transformation as a result of social learning. Biological desires, drives and/or needs are thus modified through sociocultural interactions and begin to conform to sociocultural expectations. Through this process, innate desires take the form of motivations. The psychoanalytic notion of yearning or desire is modified by experience and becomes part of a schema of motivation. Individual yearnings are progressively directed (some would say displaced) towards sociocultural values and may come to be fulfilled or attained through particular cultural activities. Desire, motivations and values are thus related but not coterminous categories. Individual desires are transformed into sociocultural motivations oriented towards specific cultural values.
Emotions emerge as an intricate part of the relationship between an individual and the larger physical, social and cultural context. Although emotions are individual responses to a wide variety of stimuli -social, cultural, personal and inanimate -they are not passive reactions to external forces. Each response emerges out of the pattern of previous responses, and future responses are based on current experiences. Emotions are enmeshed in a transformative process of feedback and change. In this way, emotions are embedded in schemas of interaction that are formed in earliest infancy; these schemas must constantly accommodate new events and activities. Emotions are the product of an individual's interaction with forces both within and beyond her/himself. The emotion experienced derives from the individual's own drives and desires in combination with memories from past performance and actions, and the social, cultural and interpersonal forces outside the actor. The relevant field of interaction outside the individual is thus spatial and historical, social and environmental. Emotions, in this view, are neither essentialized entities nor qualities, but processes. These processes, as mediators, move in both directions as both stimuli and responses. While emotions may arise as physiological responses, what evokes emotion is to a great extent culturally determined, and this aspect increases as an individual matures. Emotions are embedded not only in the processes of producing social persons, but the social relations and social contexts in which they live. The manifestation and construction of emotions are activities that define and produce the person in the social world. They are rooted in the pre-social biological organism, but they are manifested in contexts that are always already social. For this reason, they can only be experienced through social or cultural contexts. The individual learns to associate such contexts with appropriate responses.
Certain kinds of emotions become socially weighted in special circumstances; sorrow is valued at mortuary events, pride or shame at competitive events, caring in kin contexts, etc. Individuals may manifest the expression of these emotions regardless of their internal feelings. When this happens, the outward expression may reflexively produce an internal feeling of something like sorrow or pride because of the dialectical process of the schema; for example, we learn to cry at weddings, others learn to keen at funerals and both express culturally appropriate emotions. Subjective desires and goals become modified and transformed through successive experiences. What psychologists or biologists might classify as intrinsic desires become transformed into cultural motivations. As desires become affixed to specific goals or objects, emotions come into play to mediate between desire and these culturally defined intentions such that some emotions can be defined as appropriate whereas others are inappropriate.
The evaluation of appropriateness is contextual (including the social and cultural components of context), not physiological. Social emotions, or sentiments, become translated into actions that are culturally appropriate, for example, somberness at a funeral, happiness at a family reunion, regardless of what the participant is actually feeling. Nevertheless, such actions can lead to feeling states as well. In this way, emotions are transformed into action and vice versa. Despite the debates in a number of disciplines focused on defining core emotions and looking for them universally, anthropologists are most interested in the specific interactional aspects of these phenomena. What produces shame, happiness, love or pride may differ dramatically in different cultures, as may the core feelings themselves. In many of these cases what is judged and evaluated is the outward manifestations of particular emotions and not the feeling state at all. Many theorists, myself included (Fajans, 1983 (Fajans, , 1985 (Fajans, , 1997 Lutz and Abu-Lughod, 1990; Myers, 1986) , have differentiated between more personal feeling states and these social sentiments, but here I suggest that there is a continuum between them.
Emotions mediate the conflicting claims, desires and values within a culture. Similar fields of claims, desires and values occur in many cultures, however, despite differences in specific details. The reason for the similarity across cultures derives not just from the physiological capabilities of individuals, but from the commonalities of their relations to others as well. Psychologists and psychoanalysts have noted the attempts of the dependent infant to subsume the nurturer into his/her being, as well as to see the other as an extension of the self, and not just any extension, but an extension dedicated to the satisfaction of the subject's needs or desires. Many theories of personality build on this subject/object inversion, and this helps to substantiate the claim that this relation has universalistic properties that help account for the universal qualities of social emotions. Having shared ideas with Terry for many years, I find Piaget especially useful because he describes a pattern and process which become a template not just for personality but for the interactional patterns of social life as well (Turner, 1973) .
The activity of extreme egocentrism manifested by a subject is described by Piaget as assimilation (Piaget, 1950 (Piaget, , 1962 (Piaget, , 1970 (Piaget, , 1981 . The infant tries to absorb or assimilate into itself everything outside itself. The real world is such, however, that individuals cannot totally assimilate others; they have to accommodate to both the independent reality of other individuals and the environment in which they exist. This opposition between assimilation and accommodation forms the basis of ever more complex patterns of activity. The relation between them is a dialectical one; a change in one process leads to changes in the others. Individuals learn to accommodate by making changes that will enable them to better assimilate the world. Each experience and its outcome becomes the foundation for later experience. For Piaget, these processes are continuous; the relations are never static. What is constant are what he calls the functional invariants of the process: assimilation and accommodation, or autonomy and dependency. These are the basic schemas upon which much more elaborate patterns of behavior and affect rest (Piaget, 1981) . Assimilation and accommodation are not abstract forces, but are related in practice through a never-ending flow of concrete activities. The relations between them and the relations of a subject to its objective environment may attain relative equilibrium through the process Piaget calls equilibration for periods of time, but this effective balance will eventually become destabilized and require a new round of mediation and coordination, assimilation and accommodation (Piaget, 1962) .
The dialectical relationship between assimilation and accommodation parallels my earlier discussion of autonomy and interdependence. Assimilation resembles the subject's attempt to become autonomous and to retain autonomy. The life cycle, in general, is a gradual process of acquiring autonomy and independence. This is often associated with increased competence in a particular social context. But individuals are rarely in a context that permits unqualified autonomy. Most of the time an individual must accommodate to conditions and expectations outside him-or herself and relate to others as an important component of social life.
Cultural patterns of autonomy and relatedness
Behavioral patterns like dominance and assertion, or dependency and nurture, arise from both physical and social circumstances of early childhood. They are the manifestations of the processes of cultural assimilation and accommodation. As personal attributes these patterns are given differential social value. Independence and will are often associated with authority, power, fame, dominance and other qualities that have high social value. Dominance, self-assertion and self-aggrandizement make up a kind of social behavior which emerges from the process of assimilation. The form in which such assimilation is expressed, however, is often culturally specific. If performed by certain classes of people, for example senior men, warriors or ritual specialists, assertion or aggrandizement may be highly valued. Munn defines this type of autonomy as the extension of the self into spacetime to encompass aspects of the sociocultural world outside the actor's body (1986: 12) . Activities that enhance power and dominance, however, frequently impinge on other individuals' attempts to maximize their own authority and will. Autonomous individuals have to accommodate not only to cultural and social constraints but to other individuals as well. The cultural patterns which foster assertion, aggression and autonomy are usually intermixed with inverse patterns which value interdependence and 107 Fajans: Autonomy and Relatedness relatedness: cooperation, patronage, caring, etc. The inevitable friction that arises between individuals, each of whom is constantly asserting her or himself vis-a-vis others, is counterbalanced by the contrasting value, desire or motivation for interconnection with other people. Although particular cultures may lay special emphasis on certain attributes, such as fierceness, compassion, pride or shame, it is best to analyze these qualities in the larger context of motivation and behavior. What has value in a particular culture only becomes evident when members of that culture seek it. The desire for particular values is what motivates individuals to act in particular (often culturally specific) ways. Abstract cultural value or desirability is transformed into personal value by particular activities. People work to attain these attributes; motives and desires are thus oriented towards particular productive ends. People seek to enhance their own identities by acquiring or attaining cultural values, and the labor they invest in this reciprocally reproduces the value of those goods. Values in this sense are made real through the activities of people. Social practices of this sort have a temporal dimension because they endure over time and become intrinsic to successive generations. Continuity over time and the replication of desire, motivation and value as embodied in particular productive activities is the essence of social reproduction.
Desire, motivation and value are related but not identical phenomena. Values are the external and social component of social reproduction. Values are what people learn to desire because of their importance in the wider social nexus. Motivation, the acquired or learned aspect of the schema, arises out of a diffuse bodily desire but becomes oriented to particular social values. In this formulation, emotions are a component of desire and motivation, and thus stimulate an individual's actions. Emotions mediate between the individual and the outside. Emotions are neither simply affective states nor predominantly social classification. They are a schematic pattern or set of patterns which transcend the individual body but also encompass it. In earlier works I have differentiated between these two facets, focusing my analysis on the public and social side, which I called sentiments (Fajans, 1983 (Fajans, , 1985 (Fajans, , 1997 . Although there is value in differentiating between socially defined and contextualized responses and the more innate biological reactions, these two aspects are inextricably intertwined. Emotions thus have both an individual and a social component. They are points along a complex continuum. Particular emotions are classified and labeled differently in different cultures. The continuum of emotions from individual and bodily to collective and social is not sufficiently recognized; nor are all the qualities and affect that lie along this continuum recognized as emotional phenomena.
In Western cultures only part of this continuum is regularly recognized as describing emotions. The internal and private side is more squarely in the realm we classify as emotional experience and discourse, while the more public and social aspects get glossed as other kinds of phenomena often having to do with rationality, identity, intelligence/cognition, personality traits, etc. The analysis presented here suggests that the whole continuum is a cluster of related processes by which individuals are integrated with their sociocultural environment. If, as I suggest, the continuum encompasses a schema of assimilation and accommodation, each of these aspects is part of a system of processes. In schematic terms, if autonomy and interdependence are manifestations of assimilation, and nurturing, caring and empathy are qualities associated with accommodation, our folk psychology only glosses the processes of accommodation as emotional qualities or actions. It is also valid to see the assimilatory processes as part of the same system.
In the second half of this article, I give several accounts of how autonomy and relatedness function as interrelated affective qualities, and how they are in tension with one another. The particular ways these relations play out are different in different cultures, but the interrelations between them appear to be a basic human phenomenon. Nevertheless, not everyone in all societies experiences the same degree of autonomy or the same intensity of caring. These qualities may be differentially distributed across a community in a number of ways; age or gender may determine who has claims on what kinds of qualities, status, class or role specialization, etc. Some of these values may be associated with qualities that are perduring, for example, sex or wealth, others with qualities which change over timeage, initiatory status, specialization in certain activities, etc.
Individual identity and collective identity
An individual's identity emerges from the interaction between the relatively innate schemas of desire and the sociocultural values onto which they transfer, between the biological and the interpersonal. As biological desires become coded in terms of cultural motivation, individuals begin to learn to act in terms of cultural ideals. How people perceive themselves, and the status they have in the wider social nexus, are intricately bound up with motivation and value in this way. The person as a culturally motivated, symbolically mediated entity is one of the most important products a society creates. To the extent that a person attains the ideals of her culture, her prestige and identity is enhanced. Identity, then, is the product of experience, both that of being acted upon and that of acting. Identities are produced through acquiring valued attributes in the context of social interaction. Acquiring these values and the identity they produce takes work. The amount of work individuals perform in turn modifies aspects of identity. Individual identity is a product of both individual work and collective activity and values. Aspects of identity will vary depending on the values and desires considered acceptable within a particular culture and the ways that cross-cutting values are contextualized. For instance, values of nurturance and compassion may be focused primarily on the family and small social group, as among the Pintubi, whereas dominance and authority may be projected onto those outside these intimate units. Another possible scenario is that dominance may be affixed to adults and subordination to youths (Pintubi), or independence to males and dependence to females (Kaluli). In these cases certain groups in the society will take primary responsibility for certain kinds of behavior and will reap certain kinds of evaluative judgment for their success or failure.
Depending on the attributes associated with particular social groups, one group might be evaluated as more affective or emotionally driven than another, while the other is seen as more practical or rational; these differences are as culturally stereotyped as other personality attributes. Although the various groups might each experience the same emotions -pride, shame, anger, love, etc. -each of them might experience the emotion in reaction to different and group-specific stimuli. A Baining woman would feel shame at being caught looking in a mirror, but a man might feel pride in his appearance or in the job he has done decorating himself. In the United States these emotions might be reversed. A Baining woman might feel pride in her skills at cooking taro, while a Baining man, equally skilled, might feel shame or indifference towards those same skills. In any case those skills will not significantly affect his social identity. Each group will have different values associated with it; and members of the group will be differentially motivated to acquire them. Whatever the form they take, however, collective values are intertwined with collective emotions. In many societies, these differences may create complementary relations between groups in the society. Each group may have a different model of feeling, acting and judging others. These differences will greatly affect their own identities and behavior.
Although all individuals' motivations and values are culturally mediated, it is still likely that individual desires may conflict with the larger sociocultural norms and values. Individuals may well attempt to enhance their own identity and position by maximizing their autonomy. A society filled with individuals each of whom is mostly concerned with such maximization would have trouble coordinating behavior among them. In this sense, individual values and motivations might clash with collective values. While the attainment of autonomy is frequently described in terms of courage, mastery, dominance, power or self-sufficiency, the inverse value, that of interdependence, is spoken of in terms of sorrow, sadness, love, compassion and other emotions. In these cases, emotions play an active role in binding people to one another and expressing in individual affective terms the value given to sociality in general.
Affect as a gendered attribute
In many relatively egalitarian and 'simple' societies, the tensions between autonomy and relatedness are played out in ways that essentially allow all or most individuals some negotiation between the two tendencies. Where social differentiation is relatively minimal, it may mean that roles are fairly standardized. Nevertheless, this does not mean that everyone can behave the same way. In such cases affective differences may be one of the clearest markers of group differences; and the distribution of the different affective styles between groups underscores their mutual interdependence. Among the Kaluli of the Papuan Plateau, Papua New Guinea, personality characteristics and affective styles are strongly associated with gender categories (Schieffelin, 1990) . Men are considered more violent and aggressive; they are more egocentric and spontaneous about expressing their moods, needs and desires. They are quick to anger but also subject to intense emotions of sorrow and longing. The Kaluli classify these different emotional stances as gender related, but Bambi Schieffelin gives a nuanced picture of the socialization of these characteristics in early childhood. These are not innate biological differences, but learned behavior. From an early age, boys are encouraged to demand food and attention from others, primarily women, who nurture them and tolerate their imperious stance. If demands do not work to achieve their desires, however, boys are encouraged to elicit compassion and sympathy from those around by whining and evoking sadness. Girls, by contrast, are quickly taught to suppress their aggressive tendencies, and in contrast are encouraged to nurture their brothers and feel compassion (ade) for them. Compassion towards others, especially those who exhibit attributes of autonomy, is the central affective stance attributed to women. Instead of feeling impinged upon, women are supposed to feel nurturing, interrelated and responsible for others, a set of values with high social-emotional value. Not surprisingly, men are not significant agents in early childhood socialization. The system of values clearly distinguishes between the affective behaviors of men and women.
In this egalitarian society, individuals cannot easily compel one another to act. They depend on sociable relationships in which they can expect or negotiate daily cooperation and reciprocity, and through which they can define their personal autonomy. (Schieffelin, 1990: 137) In general, men tend to perform as autonomous beings while women are responsible for maintaining the ties between people. Since most of the work of holding groups together falls to the women, they appear submissive. The male-dominated society values men's affective style more than women's although it needs both. Each gender learns its dominant characteristics in early childhood and, for the Kaluli, these remain constant over the life cycle. Men's autonomous and relatively detached stance has implications for the valued social and political patterns in the society, such as the 111 Fajans: Autonomy and Relatedness importance of exchange and reciprocity, and the patterns of ritual competition. Women's more interpersonal style, however, also plays an important role in the social system, that of binding individuals into social units. Women do this by nurturing both themselves and others, as well as by submitting to the dominance of men both young and old. The main social and affective distinctions are gender based, not differentiated by age, kinship, wealth or status.
As the Kaluli example shows, no one can enhance his or her power and autonomy without the complicity of others, whether given willingly or through duress. Individuals may have to modify their behavior to conform to the expectations of their social group regardless of the values and desires which motivate their actions. Such modifications may take the form of emotions such as shame or embarrassment, which curtail certain actions, or they can be imposed through more culturally specific practices such as witchcraft accusations or threats of abandonment, etc. In order to achieve complex social goals, an actor has to manipulate a set of individual and interpersonal desires and expectations. Emotions in the wider perspective discussed in this article are the field on which these maneuvers take place.
Gender, age and status affect emotional qualities
As Myers describes valued personal and affective qualities among the Pintubi of the Central Desert, Northern Territories, Australia, expression of autonomy is gradual. It is acquired through maturity and the accrual of ritual knowledge. Pintubi autonomy, however, entails its own responsibilities. Ritual knowledge imposes the responsibility of maintaining the religious and spiritual welfare of the group, as well as the obligation to transmit the knowledge and thus perpetuate the ritual processes and the cultural bearers as social actors. Initiation and its accompanying autonomy is described affectively as passion, virility and lack of control. 'Older Pintubi men are frequently nostalgic about their post initiation days where they were "wild" and still had little responsibility' (Myers, 1986: 238) . This independent wildness is soon tempered by the opposing emotions of 'looking after', 'nurturing' and caring, which are the responsibilities of the ritual holders. 'As a consequence of initiation, young men develop obligations to exchange with other men. The autonomy they achieve is immediately countered by the responsibility to sustain a set of relationships with men from distant areas' (Myers, 1986: 239) . They are obligated to apply their knowledge for the good of the collectivity. In addition to this, they are supposed to feel compassion for youths who are related to them and are dependent on them for the transmission of knowledge and autonomy.
Although Pintubi men experience a range of social and affective states during their lives, the overall trajectory is a hierarchical one in which the more developed stages encompass those that come before. Senior men go 112 Critique of Anthropology 26 (1) through a temporal transformation from a primarily dependent status to one of egocentric autonomy. Full autonomy, however, is tempered by the values of interdependence and nurturance, which serve to decenter the egocentric qualities of autonomy. Men experience a sweeping range of affective states but these are hierarchically arranged such that an individual's autonomy encompasses his more nurturant qualities, thus the more autonomous and powerful a person is, the more caring he can also be.
Women do not share the same range of feelings and emotions as men, at least until they are older. Their emotional trajectory over the life cycle is more restricted until they become elderly ritual leaders. Although they develop a gradual autonomy and self-sufficiency, this autonomy is more confined to secular domains. They are not privy to much of the men's ritual knowledge and associated powers of ritual production and social reproduction, but they have a parallel ritual sequence of their own. In this domain, women compete with other women in their performance of rituals. As Françoise Dussart describes the situation for the neighboring Walpiri (Dussart, 2000) , each woman must exhibit her knowledge and performative skills in direct competition with other women. Each performer is supported by followers, most of whom are her kin. Women gain both prestige and followers by 'winning' such performances and appearing the most knowledgeable and effective. Autonomy and self-assertion are integrated with interrelatedness and interdependence through these events. Women simultaneously gain prestige and self-aggrandizement as they bind themselves to the welfare of the collectivity. The work of social binding is given emotional value, and women are accorded status and social identity through their success. Emotions associated with values of relatedness and interdependence are saturated with affective salience and positive emotional value.
Male and female in China
Steve Sangren reconceptualizes Chinese values of filial piety as a process of producing 'radical autonomy, a form of "will to power," in which, via the conceit of worshipping transcendent father figures, one produces oneself as a patriarchal producer' (Sangren, 2001: 192) . In his analysis of Chinese society, males are expected to cultivate strong ties with males of the ascending generations by subordinating themselves to these ancestors. He argues that this emphasis on relatedness is, in fact, a cover for the desire to escape from such subordination by becoming an ancestor oneself. The acts of piety are motivated by the desire to be autonomous and consequently to be worshipped oneself.
Males are, from birth, imbricated in a network of kin ties. One's prestige and autonomy are dependent on the acts of others. One worships the ancestors in order to produce a culture and set of values in which a man's descendants will follow suit and worship him. Men need other men to validate their own autonomy.
Conversely, women are never embraced as full members of a kin group. They lie on the social periphery as members who will marry out of one group but never fully integrate into their husband's lineage. As Sangren deduces from his analysis of the myth of Miaoshan, women desire relatedness over autonomy. Thwarted from the start as non-members, they seek to overcome their enforced valueless autonomy by seeking relatedness. Women's marginality is countered by subordination to a succession of men -fathers, husbands and finally sons. Only by producing the means of male autonomy (descendants) can women also achieve a sense of belonging.
Social emotions and their individual manifestations
Among the Gawans in the Milne Bay District, Papua New Guinea, autonomy, independence, power and fame have heightened social and cultural value (Munn, 1986) . In this society, individuals, particularly men, seek to enhance their identity and prestige by spreading their renown as widely as possible. This expansion of the self into the social world creates an aura of autonomy and independence. Men seek to extend the boundaries of their own person, through their engagement in ceremonial exchange. They exchange particular kinds of valuables that have no significant value outside the exchange system but great value within it. Possession of a particular valuable is evidence of a person's prestige and also the means of producing prestige. Valuables are not held permanently. In fact, they are given away again shortly after being received, but in being passed on, they circulate the renown of their former possessors. The objects of exchange take on aspects of their owners' identities, and the owners come to share in the renown of the objects. This continuum of identity becomes the means by which an individual achieves fame. An individual's identity is distributed or expanded as these objects circulate throughout the exchange network. Despite being passed on to new owners, they retain a connection to those who have previously possessed them. Men who have successfully engaged in exchange, and who have acquired fame in this way, are able to play increasingly dominant roles in their own society.
Not everyone in the community is equally successful in acquiring fame, dominance and power. Although the society is ideologically egalitarian, some men are more successful in achieving status than others. Whether this is because of individual characteristics or an incipient stratification in the society, the end result is a situation where some individuals attain more power and autonomy than others. In addition, the values in the society promote such inequality since prestige is a comparative quality, and an individual's prestige is weighed against the achievements of others. Ironically, men acquire prestige, autonomy and power by engaging in the ultimate 114 Critique of Anthropology 26 (1) interpersonal activity of exchange. The end result, however, is the expansion of an individual's persona as a powerful and autonomous agent.
Women in Gawa are not generally players in the Kula exchange system. They do not directly engage in the process of expanding their fame and social persona into space and time. Nevertheless, women are socialized into the same value and motivational structure and appear to recognize and seek the same values as men. In particular, they value the attainment of fame. Women can gain renown in two ways: by supporting and abetting their husbands, most commonly by giving hospitality and nurture to their husband's trading partners, but also by acting as a liaison between their husbands and their own natal families. Wives may provide the means for men to acquire both wealth and prestige. In this way, women engage in activities that enhance both their own, their husbands' and their kinsmen's reputations and identities, often simultaneously. Women's actions do not produce autonomy or independence, rather they succeed through the activities of nurture, relatedness and support, but in the end they help those who act in such ways to attain prestige, an important cultural value, and their own reputation is also enhanced. As with men, not every woman will achieve notice through these means. It will be the woman whose actions are exceptional who will attain the most value and renown.
Among the Gawans, there are strong sanctions to impel people, especially women, towards these specific cultural values. Women who are not seen as strong, supportive and interpersonally motivated are vulnerable to witchcraft accusations. Witchcraft is defined as greediness and excessive autonomy. A woman who prefers to eat her food rather than give it to others and who fails to maintain relations with other people is at risk of being accused of witchcraft. Men are rarely accused of witchcraft. Autonomy is less unsocial in males. The values of exchange and interpersonal activity are sanctioned by the negative value given to consumption and containment. Men can enhance their autonomy through exchange, but women who manifest autonomy are the inverse of the nurturing female.
In this society, the goal is fame and autonomy, a reputation that rises above the relationships that produce it. Such status, however, is dependent on the values and practices of cooperation and interdependence. The end result of this process is not merely the acquisition of renown by and for individual actors in the society. It results, rather, in the fame and renown of the society itself. An individual Gawan's fame enhances the fame of the entire island. The Fame of Gawa, as Munn titles her book, illustrates how the production of individual identity and fame generates the collective identity of the society as a whole. While individuals might vie with each other for position and stature, and might feel envy, jealousy and pride in so doing, the collective result of any one individual's success can lead to collective pride and the reproduction of the social values for society as a whole. Although individuals are basically acting in terms of personal desires and motivations, their individual actions have a result in the larger social scene.
The actions of individuals stemming from ego-centered desires and goals in fact reproduce the cultural and social values in which they are practiced. In the Gawan case, certain kinds of individual emotions (jealousy, pride, anger, shame, etc.) may be tempered by the acquisition of collective emotions such as pride or shame, which are held not merely on the basis of individual performance but that of the group. In this sense, a society that values inequities in certain contexts has ways of encompassing those inequities in other situations. Individual autonomy in seeking prestige is modulated by collective needs. Cooperation is not only practiced in household and kinship contexts but in larger social contexts as well. Noncooperation can lead to accusations of witchcraft. Witchcraft is not only a threat to an individual's well-being and reputation, but to that of society as a whole. If Gawa were to acquire a reputation for witchcraft, the fate of all Gawans would suffer; therefore all Gawans must be concerned to avoid this label for the good of the collectivity. Collective pride can give way to collective shame and even collective fear.
In one sense, in order to have this sense of collective identity, a social group must recognize itself as an entity, as Gawa does. The construction of group identity emerges as a set of shared attributes, frequently in contrast to other groups. For the Kaluli or Pintupi there is a sense of identity and incipient difference from others, but the sense of collective boundedness is more often permeated and expanded than maintained. Inclusion in the group is open to negotiation. The group is metaphorically like the person who engages in activities of relatedness and nurture. The values of connectedness and interdependence found at both the individual and social levels often motivate people to encompass outsiders as members of the group rather than exclude them as others. Perhaps because Gawa is an island and set off from other groups by vast domains of sea, the Gawans see themselves as a unit differentiated from those with whom they trade and compete. In this sense, Gawa can come to have a social identity as autonomous as well as a set of social practices and cultural values which enhance this attribute. Gawa has autonomy despite its interdependence with other Milne Bay societies (through exchange), whereas the Pintubi are intricately interdependent with the surrounding Central Desert groups despite their individual autonomy.
Despite the fact that individuals are intrinsically social and can be seen to modify their desires in conformity with social expectations and values, this kind of behavioral accommodation is only one level of social accommodation. Society can impose additional sanctions on its members. Collective emotions, desires and values may be in tension with or opposed to individual emotions. Individuals may all want to be famous and desire power, and these goals may be accorded high social value. Nevertheless, such qualities may be attainable by only a few and, even more restrictively, they may be appropriate for only certain kinds of people. Race, class, age, gender, ethnicity or ability are among the distinctions that may make some goals 116 Critique of Anthropology 26 (1) improper for certain groups of individuals. When individual desire is modulated by social values it is often experienced as a kind of emotion, such as shame, embarrassment or even fear. The arousal of such emotions may have the effect of sanctioning the behavior that produced the emotion. This can lead both to a regulation of individual emotion and of behavior. In this way we can see that emotion is a kind of activity.
Conclusions
Autonomy and relatedness form a pattern of behaviors and values that are replicated at a number of levels, from that of individual behavior through social expectations and cultural values. Similar patterns may emerge in the interaction between social groups such as age, gender or specialist groups, as well as between entire societies. In this article, I look at how the basic patterns of individual socialization, the dialectical relations between assimilation and accommodation, form a schema for individual, interpersonal and intergroup interaction, and show how such schemas are replicated in increasingly complex, extra-individual contexts. In such an analysis, a schema is not merely a template for behavior, it is also a product of previous actions. The dialectical relations between assimilation and accommodation mean that each performance or action is a dynamic response to a variety of conditions. Social behavior is produced through the intersection of different desires and values. There is a constant tension between the values of autonomy/power/authority and the need to relate and share, to love, nurture and show compassion for others. As we have seen, both values exist simultaneously in a wide variety of societies. Most of the time neither desire dominates exclusively, but one may overshadow the other in particular contexts. Each situation causes an adjustment in an individual's feeling and thinking that stimulates a negotiated response. Context is very important for understanding an individual's behavioral and emotional response.
In collective social situations, emotions are frequently arranged in complementary patterns; in order for one group to feel pride, another group might have to feel shame. In a similar way, dominance or authority by some requires subordination by others. Not all emotions are ranged in such complementary relations, but before such emotions are attributed to individual affect, such patterns must be investigated. The more social the emotions are and the context is, the more these patterns might predominate.
Emotions and motivations are oriented to and evaluated in terms of social values. These values are social and symbolic properties and attributes that are deemed important in a particular setting. Actors are frequently motivated to work to attain these values either as things they own or as attributes that they can affix to themselves as features of identity, fame or status. An individual's success or failure in attaining increments of social 117 Fajans: Autonomy and Relatedness value may be mediated by social emotions which define and locate the individual in the context of other individuals, many or all of whom share these goals and values.
Individual behavior is intrinsically bound up with the behavior of other individuals in the social and cultural domains. Individuals learn behavior and desire from others. They may learn emotions too, or at least learn what is culturally expected in particular contexts. More than this, individuals may come to share the emotions of those around them by sharing in the occasion in which they are expressed or manifested. Many theorists, among them Durkheim and Freud, have described the phenomena of collective effervescence, group psychology, etc. These collective emotions may be experienced in less dramatic forms too, as when the somberness of a funeral moves one to tears, or the contagion of enthusiasm at a sports event sweeps over the crowd. Emotions in these cases become feeling states that are aroused by external stimuli, and often by the external behavior of others, not just the reflection of the subjective state.
In all these ways, emotions are produced through the interaction between an individual and the larger sociocultural context in which he or she moves. Emotions are part of the schemas of interaction: assimilation and accommodation. This dialectical relationship is one of action. Emotions are not just passive responses to events and experiences but actively engage the subject in a relationship with the external world. They are a form of action and they participate in the collective processes of production and reproduction. Emotions are part of social activity and must be analyzed in terms of social theory.
